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Abstract 
We  examine  how  cross-country  differences  in  product,  capital,  and  labor  market 
competition, as well as earnings management affect mean reversion in accounting return 
on  assets.  Using  a  sample  of  48,465  unique  firms  from  49  countries,  we  find  that 
accounting returns mean revert faster in countries where there is more product and capital 
market  competition,  as  predicted  by  economic  theory.  Country  differences  in  labor 
market  competition  and  earnings  management  are  also  related  to  mean  reversion  in 
accounting  returns—but  the  relation  varies  with  firm  performance.  Country  labor 
competition increases mean reversion when unexpected returns are positive but slows it 
when  unexpected  returns  are  negative.  Accounting  returns  in  countries  with  higher 
earnings management mean revert more slowly for profitable firms and more rapidly for 
loss firms. Thus earnings management incentives to slow or speed up mean reversion in 
accounting  returns  are  accentuated  in  countries  where  there  is  a  high  propensity  for 
earnings management. Overall, these findings suggest that country factors explain mean 
reversion in accounting returns and are therefore relevant for firm valuation. 
 
 
Keywords: Earnings management; Mean reversion; Product market competition; labor 
market competition; Return on assets. 
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I.  Introduction 
This  paper  tests  whether  mean  reversion  in  corporate  profitability  varies 
systematically  across  countries.  We  hypothesize  that  the  degree  of  competition  in  a 
country’s product, capital, and labor markets and cross-country differences in earnings 
management affect mean reversion in corporate accounting rates of return.  
  One  of  the  strong  propositions  of  economic  theory  is  that,  in  competitive 
economies, new entrants compete away economic rents (Stigler 1961). As a result, in a 
general  equilibrium  framework,  firms  with  either  superior  or  subnormal  profits  are 
expected to converge toward the mean (e.g., Arrow and Debreu, 1954). This proposition 
has motivated a large literature in management to search for factors that enable firms to 
enjoy  sustainable  competitive  advantages  and  mitigate  economic  pressure  for  mean 
reversion (Porter 1980, 1985; Lippman and Rumelt 1982; Hoskisson et al. 2000; Wiggins 
and Rueffli 2002).  
  Understanding  whether  and  how  corporate  profitability  mean  reverts  across 
countries matters for valuation. A firm’s economic value can be measured by its ability to 
generate book returns in excess of its cost of capital (Ohlson 1995). Thus the speed of 
mean reversion in excess accounting return on assets (ROA), the measure of corporate 
profitability used throughout the paper, is critical for estimating forecast horizons and 
terminal  values  in  valuation  (Healy  et  al.  2000,  Penman  2006).  Understanding  how 
forecast horizons and terminal values vary across countries is therefore likely to allow 
investors and financial intermediaries to make more accurate valuation estimates. 
  There are two reasons to expect that country-level factors are important drivers of 
mean reversion in accounting rates of return. First, legislation in product and factor (i.e.,  
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capital and labor) markets that affect the level of competition is typically determined at 
the  country-level  (La  Porta  et  al.  1998,  Doidge  et  al.  2007).  Regulations  such  as 
government  subsidies,  import  tariffs,  labor  regulations,  and  financial  liberalization 
directly affect whether firms can sustain abnormal profits. Second, the institutions that 
govern business activities and affect entrepreneurs’ incentives to innovate and enter new 
markets are typically established at the country level (Caves 1989, Porter 1990, Khanna 
and Palepu 1997, North 1990). In this paper, we examine three measures of the strength 
of  competition  expected  to  influence  mean  reversion  in  profitability:  competition  in 
product, capital, and labor markets. 
Since  we  use  accounting  rates  of  return,  mean  reversion  is  also  likely  to  be 
affected  by  earnings  management.  Extensive  prior  research  has  shown  that  earnings 
management  varies  systematically  across  countries,  reflecting  country  differences  in 
reporting standards and enforcement (Ball et al. 2000, Leuz et al. 2003). We hypothesize 
that capital market pressure induces managers of firms with abnormally high accounting 
rates of return to use reporting discretion to slow mean reversion. In contrast, managers 
of firms with abnormally low accounting returns have capital market pressures to use 
their reporting judgment to accelerate mean reversion and demonstrate a turnaround in 
their firm’s performance. These earnings management effects are expected to be stronger 
for firms that operate in countries with higher earnings management. 
  To test our predictions, we use a sample of 48,465 unique firms from 49 countries 
in the period from 1997 to 2008. The intertemporal dynamics of corporate accounting 
rates of return are analyzed using a partial adjustment model (Fama and French 2000) 
that examines changes in returns as a function of prior years’ unexpected returns. Our  
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analysis uses firm-year-level data to examine how country measures of product and factor 
market competition and earnings management affect mean reversion in ROA. Firm-level 
observations allow us to control for firm and industry characteristics that prior studies 
have shown to affect the speed of mean reversion in earnings.  
  The results of multivariate tests reveal predictable variation in mean reversion in 
accounting profitability across countries. Mean reversion is faster in countries with more 
competitive  product  and  capital  markets.  Holding  firm  and  industry  characteristics 
constant, an inter-quartile increase in home country product (capital market) competition 
increases mean reversion for a representative firm by approximately 10.9% (3.4%). In 
contrast,  mean reversion is  slower in  countries with  more competitive labor markets. 
However, this finding is attributable to loss-making firms; for profit making firms, an 
inter-quartile  increase  in  the  labor  markets  is  accompanied  by  a  2.8%  increase  in 
accounting profitability mean reversion.  
One explanation of the anomalous results for loss firms is that, in countries with 
efficient  labor  markets,  loss-making  firms  face  greater  difficulty  in  retaining  and 
recruiting talent, making a turnaround more difficult and mitigating mean reversion. The 
labor market competition variable may also capture other institutional characteristics that 
differentially affect the loss and profit making firms in the economy. In our empirical 
tests, we attempt to control for such effects (e.g., corruption), but unobservable country 
factors that are correlated with labor market competition may drive the effect on mean 
reversion. 
Finally, our tests show a nonlinear relation between mean reversion in accounting 
returns and cross-country variation in earnings management. Profitable firms in countries  
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with  a  higher  earnings  management  propensity  have  slower  rates  of  mean  reversion, 
consistent with managers using reporting judgment to slow mean reversion. An inter-
quartile increase in the level of home country earnings management is associated with a 
3.3%  lower  mean  reversion.  In  contrast,  loss-making  firms  in  countries  with  a  high 
earnings  management propensity  have faster  rates of mean reversion,  suggesting that 
their managers used reporting discretion to  boost earnings.  For these firms, an inter-
quartile  increase  in  the  level  of  home  country  earnings  management  increases  mean 
reversion by 5.5% relative to profit-making firms. 
  In summary, our findings complement research on mean reversion in profitability 
that focuses on firm (Nissim and Penman 2001) and industry-level factors (Lev 1983, 
Fairfield et al. 2009). We document that country-level factors such as product, labor, and 
capital market competition and earnings management are associated with the rate of mean 
reversion of corporate accounting returns and are therefore relevant inputs to forecasts of 
firms’ future performance. While our results are consistent with economic theory, we 
recognize that it is difficult to attribute causality, especially given various alternative 
channels  that  drive  competitive  forces  in  an  economy  (e.g.,  government  regulation). 
Unobserved  country  characteristics  correlated  with  competition  may  drive  the  mean 
reversion results.  
  The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We develop our hypotheses in 
Section II and describe the research design in Section III. We discuss the data in Section 
IV and the results in Section V. We present additional analyses Section VI and conclude 
in Section VII. 
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II.   Hypothesis development and prior literature 
Economic theory predicts that firms’ profitability rates mean revert and converge to an 
economy-wide  mean.  Although  firms  seek  to  sustain  any  competitive  advantage  and 
resist mean reversion (Schumpeter 1942, Porter 1985), they are typically subject to the 
economic laws of competition (Aghion et al. 2001, Aghion 2002). Firms that generate 
superior  performance  face  competition  from  new  entrants,  reducing  future  rents. 
Similarly, under-performing firms either survive by improving profitability or fail, further 
leading to profitability mean reversion. 
A  long  stream  of  accounting  literature  finds  evidence  of  mean  reversion  in 
accounting  rates  of  return.  Beaver  (1970)  documented  that  firms  with  high  ROEs 
experience  a  decrease  in  ROE  in  subsequent  periods,  whereas  firms  with  low  ROEs 
experience  a  subsequent  increase,  albeit  at  a  slower  rate.  Penman  (1991)  found  that, 
although ROA is mean reverting, it also includes a persistent component that allows firms 
with high ROA to continue to outperform in the future. 
The rate at which accounting returns mean revert is of broad interest because 
equity values are based on sustainable profits (Freeman et al. 1982). The Ohlson (1995) 
valuation  framework  links  equity  values  to  profitability  persistence  and  shows  how 
equity values are a linear combination of book value and current profits weighted by 
persistence. Typically, more persistent profits generate a larger valuation effect, whereas 
purely transitory profits have little impact on a firm’s stock price. The persistence of 
corporate profitability, therefore, has a direct effect on equity valuation.  
Numerous subsequent studies have sought to understand drivers of the time-series 
properties of corporate profitability (see Kothari 2001 for a review). These studies find  
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that mean reversion in accounting returns is a function of both firm- and industry-level 
characteristics. Firm-level determinants include firm size (Lev 1983), future investment 
opportunities (Nissim and Penman 2001), and accounting measurement errors (Penman 
and Zhang 2002). Cheng (2005) shows that persistence for large firms can be explained 
in  part  by  product  differentiation  and  market  shares  (measured  using  R&D  and 
advertising intensity), suggesting that a firm’s industry structure affects the persistence of 
its performance (Waring 1996). Consistent with this hypothesis, Lev (1983) finds that 
industry barriers-to-entry, product type, and degree of capital intensity partially explain 
the persistence of ROAs. Fama and French (2000) show that that rate of mean reversion 
is greater for extreme accounting rates of returns. 
Our study contributes to this research by examining how country-level factors 
affect the persistence of accounting rates of return. We predict that the rate of mean 
reversion  in  accounting  returns  varies  across  countries  and  that  this  variation  is 
systematically related to competition in the country’s factor and product markets and the 
extent of earnings management.  
Country product market and factor competition  
Product  market  effects:  Porter  (1980)  describes  how  barriers  to  entry  (e.g.,  scale 
economies,  first  mover  advantage,  legal  barriers,  and  access  to  distribution)  affect 
product market competition. Profitable firms that face low barriers to entry are likely to 
see  their  profits  eroded  by  competitors,  leading  to  mean  reversion  in  profitability. 
Similarly, firms with underperforming business segments are likely to exit the market in 
search for higher returns, also leading to faster mean reversion of performance. Therefore  
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we predict that product market competition will increase the speed of mean reversion in 
accounting returns. 
  There  are  two  reasons  why  product  market  competition  might  vary  across 
countries. First, many countries impose trade barriers and tariffs as direct entry barriers to 
their  domestic  markets.  Such  obstacles  can  lead  to  differences  across  countries  in 
competition from foreign firms. Second, the effectiveness of regulations that promote 
product market competition varies across countries. Our empirical measure of product 
market competition thus includes both the existence of legislation that promotes openness 
in product markets (e.g., tariffs and regulatory restrictions on foreign or newly created 
firms) as well as the extent of domestic product market openness (e.g., ease of doing 
business). The appendix includes a list of variables included in our study. 
Capital market effects: An efficient capital market is expected to lead to faster mean 
reversion in accounting returns by facilitating the allocation of resources to their highest 
value in use. Such a market provides financially constrained entrepreneurs with access to 
funds required to compete against profitable incumbents, leading to increased product 
market competition and faster mean reversion (Wurgler 2000). At the same time, efficient 
capital markets discourage firms from investing in negative valued projects (Morck et al. 
2005)  and  facilitate  the  restructuring  or  closure  of  under-performing  firms,  also 
accelerating mean reversion.  
  We examine various country-level  measures  of the efficiency of the domestic 
capital market and related institutions in performing this allocation role. Following prior 
studies,  we  measure  the  efficiency  of  a  country’s  capital  market  using  the  size  and 
liquidity  of  its  domestic  equity  and  bond  markets  and  other  qualitative  measures  of  
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investor  protection  and  shareholder  rights  (La  Porta  et  al.  1998).  Our  measure  also 
reflects measures of financial institutions’ transparency and effective regulation and the 
availability of alternative capital sources, such as venture capital.  
Labor market effects: Labor is an important factor input to a firm’s production function. 
In  well-functioning  labor  markets,  new  firms  that  seek  to  challenge  successful 
incumbents can attract labor at a competitive price. In contrast, if the labor market is 
effectively closed, it will be difficult for new firms to attract talent, enabling profitable 
incumbents  to  sustain  their  performance.  Consequently,  in  more  competitive  labor 
markets,  accounting  returns  are  likely  to  mean  revert  more  rapidly.  However,  more 
competitive labor markets may also make it difficult for under-performing firms to attract 
and  retain  talent,  exacerbating  their  under-performance  and  leading  to  slower  mean 
reversion.
1  
  Competition in the labor market is expected to vary by country because domestic 
labor laws influence employment and compensation contracts (Botero et al. 2004). Rules 
governing employment security and unemployment legislation vary systematically across 
countries,  and  compensation  contracts  are  influenced  by  the  bargaining  power  of 
domestic labor unions (Freeman 1988, Siegel and Larson 2009).
2 In our empirical tests, 
we use measures of labor market regulation (e.g., unemployment and immigration laws) 
and other qualitative assessments of employment flexibility to gauge competition in the 
labor market. The above three competition factors generate our first hypothesis: 
                                                        
1 Of  course  forces  of  competition  can  force  persistent  loss-making  firms  to  quickly  exit  the  market. 
However, note that the competition variable of interest here is the competition in the labor market (and not 
competition in markets that force firms to easily exit, e.g., the takeover market). 
2 Siegel and Larson (2009) show that the extent to which the pay-for-performance relationship holds in 
different countries is related to the bargaining power of domestic labor unions.  
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H1: Greater competition in a country’s product, capital, and labor markets generates 
faster mean reversion in accounting returns.    
 
Country earnings management 
Mean reversion in accounting rates of return is also likely to be affected by earnings 
management. Extensive research has documented earnings management and its causes 
(see Dechow and Skinner (2000) and Healy and Wahlen (1999) for a summary). Ball et 
al.  (2000)  argue  that  the  level  of  earnings  management  varies  systematically  across 
countries based on differences in country reporting standards and enforcement. Studies 
find  evidence  in  support  of  country  differences  in  earnings  management  and  in  the 
enforcement of accounting standards (Leuz et al. 2003).  
We  hypothesize  that  capital  market  pressures  induce  managers  of  firms  with 
positive abnormal accounting returns to use reporting discretion to slow any effect of 
mean reversion. In contrast, managers of firms with losses and abnormally low returns 
face capital market pressures to use their reporting judgment to demonstrate a turnaround 
in their firm’s performance, accelerating mean reversion. These earnings management 
effects are expected to be stronger for firms that operate in countries with higher earnings 
management propensity. 
H2: Accounting returns in countries with higher earnings management mean revert more 
slowly for profitable firms and more rapidly for loss firms.  
 
III.  Research design 
We test the effect of institutional characteristics on performance persistence using the 
partial adjustment model proposed by Fama and French (2000): 
ROAi,t+1 – ROAi,t =  +  [ROAi,t – E(ROAi,t)] +  [ROAi,t – ROAi,t-1] + i,t+1.  (1)  
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ROA is operating income divided by total assets. We use operating income because we 
want  to  capture  the  intertemporal  dynamics  of  the  ability  of  a  company  to  deliver 
performance from its operations and because our hypotheses focus on how institutional 
characteristics  affect  a  firm’s  ability  to  sustain  economic  performance.  Moreover,  by 
using  operating  income,  we  avoid  introducing  noise  in  the  estimates  because  of 
differences  across  countries  in  the  accounting  treatment  of  non-operating  and  special 
items.
3 
  
ROAs  are  predicted  to  mean  revert  to  an  expected  value,  E(ROA),  which  is 
estimated each  year using the following  cross-sectional model (see Fama and French 
2000):
4 
ROAi,t = λ0 + λ1D/BVi,t + λ2DDi,t + λ3SIZEi,t + λ4LEVi.t + λ 5MB i,t + Fixed effects +i,t. (2) 
where D/BV is cash dividends over book value of equity; DDi,t is an indicator variable 
that takes a value of one for dividend payers and zero otherwise; SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of sales; LEV is total debt over total assets; and MB is the market-to-book 
ratio.  We  include  both  industry  and  country  indicators  to  control  for  unobservable 
changes in earnings that are not captured by the variables included in equation (2). This 
model is widely used in prior literature (Fama and French 2006) and assumes that the 
predictors of ROA in the current period are sufficient to predict current expected ROA. In 
                                                        
3 When we use net income excluding extraordinary items, we find very similar results, and when we use net 
income including extraordinary items, we find similar results but the statistical significance is reduced. 
4 Our specification differs from the standard partial adjustment model used in the capital structure literature 
(Flannery and Rangan 2006). Unlike standard adjustment models , which use current variables to measure 
the level of the future targets (e.g., expected target ROA), we use current observables to measure the level 
of the current expected value (e.g., expected current ROA). An important assumption for our model is that 
expected ROA does not include abnormal profits. If this assumption does not hold, leading to measurement 
errors that are correlated with our country-level competition variables, the model estimates are likely to be 
biased. In our main analyses, we include specific country-level controls that can drive such measurement 
errors (e.g., properties of reported earnings). In addition, we test the sensitivity of our results using a one-
stage estimation methodology (see Table V).   
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other words, no residual autocorrelation exists in the explanatory variables in equation 
(2). We estimate the coefficients using Fama Macbeth regressions.
5  
The estimated    coefficient  in  equation  (1)  is  the  level  of  mean  reversion  in 
profitability and our main variable of interest. If ROA exhibits mean reversion, we expect 
 to be negative. This can be seen by rearranging the model in equation (1) as following: 
ROAi,t+1 =  + (1+) ROAi,t + (- ) E(ROAi,t) +  [ROAi,t – ROAi,t-1] + i,t+1.  (3) 
Assuming that no residual autocorrelation exists in changes in ROA (=0), the coefficient 
on the second term (1+) can be interpreted as the persistence of earnings examined in 
prior literature (Francis et al. 2004). Also, the second and third terms of equation (3) 
imply  that  future  ROA  is  a  weighted  average  of  current  realized  ROA  and  current 
expected ROA. If  equals zero, current realized ROA fully persists in the next period. 
Alternatively, if   takes  the value of  -1, next  period’s  ROA is  determined  solely  by 
expected ROA, and there is zero persistence. Finally, the fourth term ([ROAt – ROAt-1]) 
controls for residual autocorrelation in changes in ROA not captured by the first partial 
adjustment term. 
To examine whether country-level variables affect mean reversion, we estimate 
the following variant of model (1): 
 
ROAi,t+1 – ROA i,t =  +  κ CVAR +   [ROA i,t – E(ROA i,t)] +  [ROA i,t – ROA i,t-1]  
+   [ROA i,t – E(ROA i,t)] * CVAR +   [ROA i,t – ROA i,t-1] * CVAR 
                                                        
5 The average explanatory power of this model is 20%, similar to the explanatory power that Fama and 
French (2000) report in their sample of US firms. We also estimated expected ROA by omitting country 
and industry indicator variables. The predicted ROA was highly correlated (0.89) with the estimate we use. 
Note, however, that our 12-year sample period is relatively short and may yield noisy lambda estimates.  
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+  λ Controlsi,t +  μ Controlsi,t * CVAR +  i,t+1.  (4) 
The  interaction  term    directly  tests  our  main  prediction  that  mean  reversion  of 
accounting profits varies systematically with country variables representing product and 
factor market competition and earnings management (CVAR). The estimated coefficients 
represent  the  incremental  mean  reversion  associated  with  these  factors.  We  cluster 
standard  errors  both  at  the  firm  and  year  levels  to  control  for  serial  correlation  in 
performance persistence within the same firm and for cross-firm correlation within the 
same year (Petersen 2009). In addition, we adjust the standard errors using the Murphy-
Topel variance estimator for two-step models (Murphy and Topel 1985).
6 
In addition to the country-level competition variables of primary interest, Model 
(4) includes controls for firm-, industry-, and country-level variables that prior research 
has found to be related to mean reversion in  profitability (see Cheng 2005 and Nissim 
and  Penman  2001).  Firm-level  variables  include  market  share,  R&D  intensity,  the 
market-to-book multiple, and the level of diversification. Market share (Market Share) is 
the ratio of a firm’s sales to total industry sales, where industries are classified using the 
Fama-French  (1997)  four-digit  classification.  R&D  intensity  (R&D)  is  R&D  expense 
deflated  by  sales.  Market-to-book  (MTB)  controls  for  future  growth  opportunities. 
Industry  diversification  (Segments)  is  the  number  of  segments  in  which  a  company 
operates. 
Industry-level factors include the industry market-to-book ratio (Industry MTB) as 
a proxy for the growth prospects of the industry. Following Cheng (2005), we control for 
                                                        
6 The Murphy-Topel adjustment accounts for the fact that estimated regressors (e.g., E(ROA i,t)]) may be 
measured with sampling error. Such sampling error may bias the estimated covariance matrix in the second 
stage, even in large samples.  
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industry product innovation using industry R&D intensity (Industry R&D), measured as 
mean R&D to sales ratio of all firms in the industry. We also include the Herfindahl 
industry  concentration  index  (Herfindahl),  computed  by  the  sum  of  squared  market 
shares  of  all  firms  in  an  industry,  to  reflect  industry  competition  (Lev  1983).  Prior 
research indicates that the index is negatively related to industry mean reversion. Also, 
we include industry indicators to control for other persistent industry-level factors that 
affect the time-series properties of profits. 
Finally,  we  include  country-level  controls  that  reflect  the  different  degrees  to 
which  accounting  earnings  reflect  economic  fundamentals.  Differences  in  accounting 
standards  and  institutional  characteristics  can  lead  to  differences  in  how  accounting 
measures  of  profitability  capture  economic  rate  of  returns  (Rajan,  Reichelstein,  and 
Soliman  2007).  We  control  for  earnings  timeliness  measured  from  an  asymmetric 
timeliness model of earnings and returns as in Bushman and Piotroski (2006).
7 More 
timely earnings reflect the faster conversion of economic income into accounting income. 
Also, we control for the risk of corruption measured as the level of bribery and corruption 
in each country (Less corruption). We include the level of corruption to control for cross-
country differences in managerial ability to circumvent product, capital, and labor market 
competition by illegal means (e.g., bribery).
8 In addition, we include country indicators to 
                                                        
7 Earnings  timeliness  is  the  estimated  sum  of  coefficients  on  stock  returns  and  stock  returns  times  an 
indicator variable for negative returns, from an asymmetric timeliness model of earnings and returns as in 
Bushman and Piotroski (2006). We also test the sensitivity of the analysis using measures of timely loss 
recognition (coefficient on the indicator variable for negative returns) and find similar results.  
8 How the level of corruption will influence the rate of mean reversion in corporate profitability critically 
depends on who bribes. If more profitable firms pay bribes to acquire permits and contracts, then the rate of 
mean reversion of corporate profitability will be slower. If less profitable firms pay bribes, then they will be 
able to improve their performance faster , leading to a faster mean reversion of corporate profitability . 
Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis (2012) find that underperforming firms in corrupt countries are more likely to 
pay bribes, which would accelerate competition and mean reversion in accounting returns. In contrast, Bliss 
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control  for  unobserved  country-level  factors that  cause mean reversion  of accounting 
profitability to vary across countries.  
 
IV.  Sample and data 
Country-level independent variables   
Annual data on country product and factor market competition are from the IMD World 
Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY). Each year since 1996, the yearbook has analyzed and 
ranked  the  ability  of  nations  to  create  and  maintain  an  environment  that  sustains 
enterprise competitiveness.
9 It reports more than 300 measures  of competitiveness for 
58 countries. Approximately two-thirds of the measures reported are statistical data from 
international, national and regional organizations, private institutions , and a network of 
54 partner institutes worldwide. The remaining third are from an annual executive survey 
(Executive Opinion Survey), which covers such factors as management practices, labor 
relations,  environmental  concerns,  and  quality  of  life .  The  number  of  firms  and 
executives from a given country  targeted by the survey is proportional to  the country’s 
share of world GDP.  Within  a country, industries are  sampled  in  proportion  to  their 
contribution to the country  GDP. Business executives surveyed include nationals and 
expatriates  with  global  operating  experience  who  are  employed  by  local  and  foreign 
enterprises in the country. Survey participants are asked to draw on their experiences to 
evaluate dimensions of competitiveness for the economy where they have operated and 
resided during the prior year. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and Di Tella (1997) find that strong performing firms pay bribes to protect their market position, which 
would reduce mean reversion in accounting returns through less competition. 
9 For more information, see http://www.imd.org/research/publications/wcy/index.cfm  
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We  use  17  of  the  variables  published  by  WCY  to  estimate  the  country 
competitiveness variables used in the paper.
10 The country product market competition 
variable includes measures of the product market’s openness to foreign firms as well as 
policies,  laws  and  regulations  that  affect  competition in  the  product  market.  Country 
labor market competition includes policies and laws that affect the costs of employment 
and labor market flexibility. Country capital market competition includes measures of the 
size and efficiency of banks, stock markets, and other types of financing intermediaries. 
The specific country-level institutional variables used are defined in the appendix. 
  To construct country-level variables for product and factor market competition, 
we first standardize each of the WCY country variables reported in the appendix in a 
given year by subtracting its mean and dividing by its cross-country standard deviation. 
This ensures that each variable has equal importance when we aggregate the variables. 
Next, we generate a single measure of product, capital, and labor market competition for 
each country-year using the mean of the standardized variables. 
Country  earnings  management  variables  are  computed  using  the  earnings 
management index from Leuz et al. (2003). The index (EM) is a composite of the well-
known earnings management measures used by prior studies (e.g., smoothing operating 
earnings  through  accruals,  smoothing  reflected  in  the  correlation  between  changes  in 
operating  accruals  and  operating  cash  flows,  discretionary  accruals,  and  loss 
avoidance).
11 Following Leuz et al. (2003) and t o mitigate potential measurement error, 
                                                        
10 In untabulated results, we find that the results are largely consistent when we include all 54 parameters in 
our measure of market competition. 
11 Prior studies find that the small profit measure is a component of the overall measure (Durtschi and 
Easton 2009). In untabulated analysis, we rerun our analysis excluding the small profit measure from our 
EM measure. Our inferences remain unchanged.  
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we construct an overall summary measure of earnings management for each country. For 
each of the four earnings management measures, countries are ranked such that a higher 
score  suggests  a  higher  level  of  earnings  management.  The  aggregate  earnings 
management score is computed by averaging the country rankings for the four individual 
earnings management measures. 
Firm and industry variables 
Our data on firm performance are from Worldscope. We restrict our sample to the years 
1997 to 2008. Prior to 1997, WorldScope has data for only a few developing countries, 
restricting our ability to investigate the role of country characteristics in performance 
mean reversion. From the universe of WorldScope, we delete observations with missing 
data, ROA greater than 100% or less than -100%, banks and other financial firms, firms 
with missing data for consecutive years, firms from countries with no available data in 
the WCY, and firms from countries with fewer than 50 observations.
12 We exclude all 
firms with book value of  total assets less than $5 million.
13 The final sample comprises 
319,029 firm-year observations for 48,465 unique firms from 49 countries. 
  Table I presents country means for variables used in the empirical tests.
14 The 
country average change in  ROA is -0.005. Hong Kong and Singapore have the most 
competitive  product,  labor ,  and  capital  markets.  Russia  and  Japan  have  the  least 
competitive product markets. Slovakia and Mexico  have the least competitive capital 
markets. And  France and Germany  have the least competitive labor markets. Country 
                                                        
12 Most of the observations we eliminate are for firms classified as financial institutions or firms with 
missing observations for some of the variables of interest. 
13 Fama and French (2000) exclude the observations of firms with total assets below $10 million or a book 
value of equity below $5 million. Given that we have an international sample, we halved the book value of 
assets threshold. In untabulated analysis, we find that our results are robust to  imposing an even lower 
threshold of $1 million. 
14 We winsorize all dependent and independent variables in the regression at 1 and 99%.  
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ratings indicate that earnings management is less frequent in the US, Australia and New 
Zealand, and most severe for Argentina, the Czech Republic, Greece, and Turkey.
15 The 
average  market share, R&D, and MTB across countries  are  0.19, 1.55%, and  1.85, 
respectively. The average Herfindahl index is 0.31, and the log of number of segments is 
0.69.  
  Table II presents correlations between the independent variables.  Countries with 
more competitive product and capital markets  have firms with higher R&D and MTB 
multiples as well as lower market shares, Herfindahl indices, and business diversification. 
In addition, countries with more competitive  product and factor  markets  show less 
country-level earnings management and more earnings timeliness (Dhaliwal, et al. 2008). 
The highest univariate correlation between any of the competition variables is for capital 
and labor market  (0.432), and the  lowest correlation is  for product and capital market 
competition (0.350). 
 
V.  Results 
Table  III  presents  the  results  of  estimating  model  (4).
16 Because  the  country-level 
variables  are  highly  correlated (see Table II),   we examine the  significance  of each 
variable individually  and  as a group.  Columns (1)  and  (2) show that  the  interactive 
coefficients on the country  competition variables are negative and significant, implying 
that increased product and capital market competition increase the rate of mean reversion 
                                                        
15 We do not report the country-level competition measures because of the restrictions in the purchase 
agreement with IMD. Alternatively, we provide the list countries in the high, medium, and low tercile 
group for each competition measure (see Table I). We thank the editor for making this suggestion.   
16 In untabulated analysis, we find that the country average rate of mean reversion for the pooled sample is 
0.26. Fama and French (2000) estimate the mean reversion for a sample of US firms for an earlier period at 
0.38.  
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as  predicted.
17 These effects are economical ly  and  statistically significant.  An inter-
quartile increase in product and capital market competition increases the mean reversion 
of  profitability  by  9.5%  and  4.2%  respectively.  The  coefficient  on  labor  market 
competition in column (3) is insignificant. The coefficient on earnings management in 
column (4) is negative and significant suggesting that in countries with more earnings 
management, there is faster mean reversion. However, this coefficient may capture other 
institutional characteristics correlated with the earnings management proxies.  
We therefore  include  the  three market competition variables and the earnings 
management measures simultaneously in the model.
18 The results, reported in column (5), 
show that the interactive product and capital market competition estimates continue to be 
negative  and  significant,  suggesting  that  increased  competition  in  these  markets  is 
accompanied by higher mean reversion   in profitability.  An inter-quartile increase  in 
product  and  capital  mark et  competition  increase s  the  rate  of   mean  reversion  of 
profitability by  10.9%, and  3.4% respectively.  The estimate on the interactive labor 
market competition is now positive and significant,  indicating that, after controlling for 
the level of competition in product and capital markets, corporate profitability mean 
reverts slower in countries with more competitive labor markets.   The coefficient on 
                                                        
17 The mean reversion parameters in all these models are negative. A negative interaction term therefore 
implies that the rate of mean reversion is greater for more competitive countries.   
18 None of the variance inflation factors were higher than four, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a 
significant problem. We further investigate the stability of the estimated coefficients  by estimating our 
model using a large set of randomly drawn subsamples. We draw 500 samples, each with 50% of the 
observations  randomly  drawn  from  our  original  sample.  We  re-estimate  equation  (4)  and  generate  a 
distribution  of  500  coefficients  for  each  market  competition  variable.  The  sample  means  (standard 
deviation) of coefficients on product, capital, and labor market competition are -0.07 (0.022), -0.03 (0.013), 
and 0.03 (0.014), respectively. The statistical inferences from this analysis resemble those reported in Table 
III, with t-statistics of 3.18, 2.31, and 2.14 for each of the competitiveness coefficients.  
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earnings  management  is  insignificant.  We  investigate  these  results  further  in  the 
following section in a nonlinear specification.  
To demonstrate how differences in the country variables affect firm performance, 
we estimate ROA mean reversion for the five countries with the least competitive product 
markets (lowest decile) and the five countries with the most competitive product markets 
(top  decile).  The  mean  reversion  estimates  for  these  subsamples  are  0.34  and  0.20, 
respectively. Figure Ia shows that firms with extreme positive ROAs of almost 17% (the 
top decile) can expect to see their ROA fall to 5% within four years, if they are domiciled 
in countries with highly competitive product markets, versus seven years, if they are in 
the least competitive markets. Similarly, firms  with extreme negative  ROAs of -12% 
(lowest decile) can anticipate their ROA increasing to -5% after three years, if they are in 
the  most  competitive  product  markets,  versus  five  years,  if  they  are  in  the  least 
competitive markets.  
To  illustrate  how  these  differences  affect  firm  valuation,  consider  two 
hypothetical firms with a weighted average cost of capital of 6%, current ROA of 17%, 
and  book  asset  growth  of  3%.  The  first  firm  is  from  a  country  in  the  bottom  five 
competitive product markets where mean reversion is 20%, and the second is from a 
country in the top five competitive product markets where mean reversion is 34%. We 
use these estimates to forecast ROA for the next 10 years and generate implied value-to-
asset multiples for the two firms.
19 The firm from a top five country has a multiple of 
                                                        
19 The value to book multiples are ∑
     (    )    (   )   
(   ) 
  
   
  for the firm from the bottom five country 
and∑
     (     )    (   )   
(   ) 
  
   
 for the firm from the top five country, where g is the growth rate 3% and r 
is the weighted average cost of capital 6%.   
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1.44 versus 1.66 for the firm operating in a bottom five country. For firms with extreme 
negative ROAs of -12%, the equivalent value-to-asset ratios are 0.53 and 0.69. 
In Figure Ib, we show the mean reversion pattern using actual (as opposed to 
predicted) ROA. Here, we use a matched sample to control for other firm characteristics. 
That is, for each firm in the group of least competitive countries, we find a matching firm 
from the most competitive countries that is closest in terms of MTB and market share. 
We control for these two variables because our empirical analyses indicate that they are 
strong determinants of mean reversion. Similar to Figure Ia, we find that the rate of mean 
reversion in realized ROA varies systematically by country-level competition. Firms with 
extreme positive ROAs of 17% (the top decile) can expect to see their ROA fall to 5% 
within  five  to  six  years,  if  they  are  domiciled  in  countries  with  highly  competitive 
product markets, versus almost ten years, if they are in the least competitive markets.
  
  As  noted  above,  model  (2)  also  controls  for  other  firm-  and  industry-level 
variables that have been shown to predict performance mean reversion in prior studies. 
We only present the coefficients of the interaction terms and do not tabulate all the main 
effects for the sake of parsimony. Consistent with earlier findings, the results in Table III 
indicate that profitability mean reversion decreases with firm market share, MTB, and 
diversification and increases with firm R&D (Cheng 2005), industry MTB (Nissim and 
Penman 2001), and the Herfindahl index (Jacobsen 1988). The country-level earnings 
timeliness estimate is positive and weakly significant, indicating that countries with more 
timely earnings have slower mean reversion (Rajan et al. 2007).  
Mean reversion for firms with positive/negative unexpected accounting returns   
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We next examine whether the country factors differentially affect mean reversion for 
firms  with  positive  and  negative  unexpected  accounting  returns.  The  earnings 
management hypothesis predicts that capital market pressure induces managers of firms 
with positive unexpected ROAs to manage earnings to slow mean reversion and, for 
those with negative unexpected ROAs, to accelerate mean reversion. These effects will 
be intensified in countries with more opportunities for earnings management. We also 
examine whether the effect of labor market competition documented above for all firms 
holds equally for firms with positive and negative unexpected ROAs.  
To do so, we adopt the approach of Fama and French and  expand the partial 
adjustment  model  (eq.  (4))  and  estimate  a  nonlinear  version  of  the  model  that 
differentiates  between  positive  and  negative  unexpected  accounting  returns.  The 
nonlinear specification includes all terms as in eq. (4) and interaction terms where each 
term is interacted with a NEG indicator that takes the value one for firms with negative 
unexpected ROAs and zero otherwise. Our proxy for unexpected ROA is the difference 
between realized ROA and expected ROA, where expected ROA is the predicted value of 
model (2), which is estimated separately on a rolling basis using all prior years in the 
sample. We estimate the following nonlinear model: 
ROAi,t+1 – ROA i,t =  +  κ CVAR+   [ROAi,t – E(ROAi,t)] +  [ROAi,t – ROA i,t-1] +   [ROAi,t–
(ROAi,t)]  * CVAR +   [ROA i,t – ROAi,t-1] * CVAR +  λ Controlsi,t +  μ Controlsi,t * CVAR + 
NEG*{ κloss CVAR +  NEG [ROAi,t – E(ROAi,t)] + loss [ROAi,t – ROAi,t-1] +  NEG [ROAi,t – E(ROAi,t)] 
* CVAR + loss [ROAi,t – ROAi,t-1]*CVAR + λNEGControlsi,t + μNEGControlsi,t * CVAR} + i,t+1.   (5) 
The interaction terms, NEG, represent differences in country factors associated with mean 
reversion for firm-years with positive and negative unexpected accounting returns in the 
current year t.  
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In column (1) of Table IV, we present the results. For observations with positive 
unexpected  ROAs,  the  product,  capital,  and  labor  market  estimates  are  negative  and 
significant, consistent with economic theory—firms in countries with more competitive 
product,  capital,  and  labor  markets  experience  faster  mean  reversion  in  years  with 
positive  unexpected  ROAs.  Consistent  with  the  earnings  management  hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 2), the earnings management estimate is 0.0031 and significant, implying 
slower  mean  reversion  of  positive  unexpected  accounting  returns  in  high  earnings 
management  countries.  For  these  firm-years,  an  inter-quartile  increase  in  earnings 
management decreases the rate of mean reversion by 3.3%.  
For  firms  with  negative  unexpected  accounting  returns,  several  interesting 
differences emerge. First, the product market interaction effect is negative and sizable     
(-0.0944), indicating that mean reversion induced by product market competition is even 
more pronounced for firms with negative unexpected ROAs. Second, the labor market 
interaction effect is 0.0817 and significant, indicating that that, when unexpected ROAs 
are  negative,  labor  market  competition  slows  mean  reversion,  in  contrast  to  its 
accelerating effect when unexpected ROAs are positive. One explanation for this finding 
is that, in competitive labor markets, firms with large negative shocks to ROA find it 
difficult to retain existing employees and attract new labor required to turn themselves 
around.  
Column (1)  also  shows that the estimated  earnings  management  coefficient  is       
-0.0084 and significant. This implies that mean reversion of negative unexpected ROAs 
is faster in countries with a higher propensity for earnings management, consistent with 
the earnings  management  hypothesis.  The effect  is  also  economically significant—an  
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inter-quartile increase in the level of earnings management increases the speed of mean 
reversion by 5.5%.  
In summary, results for firms with positive and negative unexpected accounting 
returns  confirm  full  sample  results  that  competition  in  product  and  capital  markets 
accelerates  mean  reversion.  They  also  support  the  hypothesis  that  capital  market 
incentives to manage earnings to slow or accelerate mean reversion in accounting returns 
are accentuated in countries where there is a high propensity for earnings management.
20 
The findings provide additional evidence on our earlier findings for country labor market 
competitiveness by showing that their slowing of mean reversion in accounting returns is 
driven exclusively by negative unexpected ROA observations.  
 
VI.  Additional Tests 
Domestic vs. multinational companies 
The  documented  country  effects  should  be  stronger  for  domestic  firms  than  for 
multinationals whose operations are also affected by other countries where they operate. 
We therefore compare home country competition effects on mean reversion separately 
for the two types of firms. Domestic firms are defined as those with more than 80% of 
                                                        
20 Research has indicated that, with more competition in the product markets, firms have less incentive to 
provide quality disclosure because they have incentives to hide profitable business opportunities from their 
competitors (Li 2010). This suggests that earnings management incentives to slow mean reversion for high-
performing firms and to accelerate mean reversion for poor-performing firms are likely to be attenuated in 
countries  with  more  competitive  product  markets.  In  untabulated  results,  we  test  this  hypothesis,  by 
estimating the effect of product market competition separately for firm-years with positive and negative 
unexpected ROAs. The model mirrors equation (5) but includes additional terms that interact the effect of 
country earnings management and product competition on mean reversion. We find that, for the positive 
unexpected ROA sub-sample, the significant earnings management estimate of 0.0174 is consistent with 
managers of countries with a high earnings management propensity using their reporting discretion to delay 
mean  reversion,  as  documented  above.  But  this  effect  is  attenuated  for  managers  of  firms  in  more 
competitive product markets, reflected in the significant interactive estimate of -0.0019. This finding is 
consistent with product market competition counteracting incentives of managers in countries with high 
earnings management to boost reported profitability and slow mean reversion.   
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assets and sales in the home country market, whereas multinational firms have more than 
50% of sales or assets outside their home country.
21  
The first column  of Table V shows that the results for domestic firms are very 
similar  to  those  reported  in  Table  I V.  The  second  column  shows  the  results  for 
multinational  firms.  The statistical significance of product market competition,  labor 
market  competition,  and  earnings  management  are  weaker  for  multinational  firms , 
especially in the presence of losses. Overall, the findings confirm that country effects on 
ROA mean reversion are lower for multinationals than for purely domestic firms. 
Findings using size-weighted variables also support this conclusion. Results using 
size-weighted variables, where the size weight is sales  in US dollars,  are  shown in 
column three of Table V. They indicate that home country institutions are less important 
for the rate of mean reversion  for  the largest companies in the world.  Since these 
companies operate in  dozens of countries, their home country  characteristics have less 
impact on mean reversion in corporate profitability.  
Economic development control  
Since institutional forces that drive economic development and market competition are 
often correlated, our findings for market competition effects could reflect differences in 
economic development across countries rather than competition per se. To examine this 
possibility,  we  estimate  the  effect  of  market  competition  after  controlling  for  the 
country’s level of economic development (GDP per capita). The findings, reported in 
column four of Table V, show that, after controlling for economic development, most of 
our results remain qualitatively unchanged. Interestingly, the relation between economic 
                                                        
21 If either foreign assets or sales are missing, then we define a firm as multinational if either foreign assets 
or sales are greater than 20% of total assets or sales, respectively.  
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development and performance mean reversion is positive and significant for firms that 
report losses, suggesting that controlling for market competition, poor performance in 
developed economies persists longer than in less developed economies.  
One-stage estimation 
Prior  studies  find  that  the  partial  adjustment  model  can  be  sensitive  to  alternative 
estimation strategies. For example, Flannery and Rangan (2006), in their study of firm 
leverage, document that the adjustment model estimates are sensitive to the specification 
of expected leverage, especially when the standard deviation for the first stage estimates 
are high. They conclude that, when it comes to target leverage, researchers are better off 
estimating adjustment models in one stage rather than two (Flannery and Rangan 2006, 
Table 3). Although our estimation does not involve leverage, we examine the sensitivity 
of our analysis using a one-stage estimation model: 
ROAi,t+1 =  +  ROA i,t  +  ROA i,t-1 +  κ CVAR +  λ Controlsi,t +   ROAi,t-1 * 
CVAR +  μ Controlsi,t * CVAR +  i,t+1. (6) 
The Controlsi,t include all the variables used to estimate expected ROA from model (2), 
in addition to all the existing controls used in model (4). 
Table VI reports the estimated results of the nonlinear version of the model that 
differentiates between abnormal profits and losses. The nonlinear specification includes 
all terms as in eq. (6) and interaction terms where each term is interacted with a NEG 
indicator. Coefficients on product, capital, and labor market competition are negative and 
significant with slightly increased magnitudes compared to the estimates in Table IV. As 
in Table IV, the country earnings management interaction estimate is positive for firms 
that outperform expectations and negative for underperformers.  
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Out-of sample predictions 
To  assess  whether  the  country-level  competition  and  earnings  management 
variables  are  useful  for  predicting  ROA  out  of  sample,  we  estimate  our  basic 
specification in Table III column (4) with and without the four country-level variables of 
interest for the years 1997-2002 (first half of our sample). We then use the estimated 
coefficients to predict the change in ROA in years 2003-2008 under both models (with 
and  without  the  four  country-level  variables  of  interest).  We  compare  the  predicted 
change in ROA with the realized change in ROA and calculate the absolute difference 
between the two (forecast error). In untabulated analyses, we find statistically significant 
reductions in the mean (value=-0.0028, p-value=0.0486) and median (value=-0.0012, p-
value=0.0822) forecast errors using the model that includes the four country variables. 
These findings lead us to conclude that adding the four country variables improves the 
ability to forecast ROA out-of-sample.  
 
 
VII.  Conclusion   
This paper tests whether persistence in firms’ accounting returns varies systematically 
across countries. We find that country product, capital, and labor market (although the 
effect of labor market is not robust across all specifications) competition all affect the rate 
of  mean  reversion  of  corporate  profitability.  When  we  consider  all  variables 
simultaneously, we find that product market and capital market variables have the largest 
impact on performance persistence. Labor market competitiveness appears to increase 
mean  reversion  for  firm-years  when  ROAs  exceed  expectations,  consistent  with 
economic theory. But it slows mean reversion in poor performance years. We argue that  
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underperforming  firms  in  countries  with  competitive  labor  markets  have  difficulty 
retaining  and  attracting  talented  employees  to  implement  a  turnaround.  However,  we 
recognize that other country-level characteristics might be correlated with labor market 
competition and cause this effect on mean reversion. Finally, in countries with higher 
earnings  management  propensity,  profitability  mean  reverts  slower  for  firms  with 
positive  unexpected  ROAs  and  faster  for  those  with  negative  unexpected  accounting 
returns, consistent with capital market incentives driving earnings management.   
Our study is subject to several caveats. First, as with any empirical study, the 
findings are a joint test of the empirical proxies correctly capturing the managerial intent. 
This is particularly relevant for our earnings management tests. Although there is a large 
literature using the measure employed in our tests in an international context, it may be 
confounded by other institutional  characteristics  we examine, leading to an errors-in-
variables  problem  (Durtschi  and  Easton  2009,  Wysocki  2009).  Second,  although  our 
predictions  are supported by economic theory  and  are robust to  various controls  and 
specifications, we recognize that it is difficult to prove causality, especially given various 
alternative  channels  that  drive  competitive  forces  in  the  economy  (e.g.,  government 
regulation). 
Notwithstanding such limitations, we believe that our findings are likely to be 
useful to scholars and practitioners interested in understanding how country factors affect 
corporate profitability. At a practical level, our results indicate that valuation exercises, 
which  require  terminal  value  assumptions  on  the  sustainability  of  profitability,  can 
benefit  from  considering  country  as  well  as  traditional  firm  and  industry  factors  in 
settling on the speed with which superior or inferior profits are likely to mean revert.  
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Also, including the country-level competition measures is likely to improve the predictive 
ability of future corporate profitability.    
Our  study  raises  several  questions  for  future  research.  For  example,  we 
considered home-country characteristics that could affect mean reversion of profitability 
across the world. Yet the sustainability of multinational firms’ profitability is also likely 
to  be influenced by host-country competitive and efficiency  factors (Rodríguez et  al. 
2005).  Future  research  could  also  examine  whether  research  analysts  understand  and 
incorporate the implications of differences in country product and factor competition and 
earnings management in their long-term forecasts.  
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Appendix 
Selected Measures from IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook used to Construct 
Annual Country Product and Factor Market Competition Variables 
 
Product market competition 
  Protectionism   Protectionism does not impair the conduct of your business  
Public sector contracts   Public sector contracts are sufficiently open to foreign bidders  
Subsidies   Subsidies do not distort fair competition and economic development  
Ease of doing business   Ease of doing business is supported by regulations  
Creation of firms   Creation of firms is supported by legislation  
Labor market competition 
  Labor regulations   Labor regulations do not hinder business activities  
Unemployment legislation   Unemployment legislation provides an incentive to look for work  
Immigration laws   Immigration laws do not prevent your company from employing foreign labor  
Redundancy costs   Number of weeks of salary  
Labor market flexibility   Index on rigidity of employment (index 0-100)  
Capital market competition 
  Banking sector assets   Percentage of GDP  
Banking and financial services   Banking and financial services do support business activities efficiently  
Financial institutions’ transparency   Financial institutions’ transparency is sufficiently implemented  
Stock market capitalization   Percentage of GDP  
Shareholders’ rights   Shareholders’ rights are sufficiently implemented  
Venture capital   Venture capital is easily available for businesses  
The IMD Institute uses the following methodology to provide a ranking of the competitiveness of each nation: Each sub-variable 
that is a survey item takes a value from 1 to 10. All other sub-variables that are hard measures take their raw values. All sub-
variables are then standardized across countries by subtracting the average across the countries and dividing by the standard 
deviation. Then the standardized values of the sub-variables are aggregated. For more information see:  
http://www.imd.org/research/publications/wcy/upload/methodology.pdf  
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Figure I: Evolution of estimated ROA for firms from countries with the least and most competitive product markets 
 
Figure Ia                Figure Ib 
   
 
Figure I shows the evolution of estimated ROA for two groups of countries: for the five countries with the least competitive product markets and for the five 
countries with the most competitive product markets across the years in the sample. Figure Ia is based on the coefficients from the predicted values from a 
multivariate regression. The estimated mean reversion for the sample of countries with the most (least) competitive product markets is 0.35 (0.24). The beginning 
ROA is equal to the ROA of a firm that ranks on the 90
th percentile or the 10
th percentile of the ROA distribution. Figure Ib is based on the mean actual ROA for 
the firms in each sub-sample over the five subsequent years. To ensure that our results are not driven by differences in firm characteristics, we match for each 
firm in the group of least competitive countries with a firm from the most competitive countries that is closest in terms of market to book value and market share.  
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Table I: Summary statistics by country  
           Country-level competition variables  Properties of accounting     Other control variables    
      ROAt-ROAt-1 
Mean 
reversion 
Product  
market 
Capital 
market 
Labor  
market    Earnings 
management  Timeliness   
Market 
share  R&D  MTB  Herfindahl 
 index  Segments 
Country  N  Mean            Mean  Mean     Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean 
Argentina  1,489  (0.00)  45%  Low  Low  Low    28.3   0.36     0.16   0.00   0.95   0.23   0.48  
Australia  10,009  (0.00)  38%  High  Med  High    4.8   0.38     0.05   0.04   2.60   0.21   0.38  
Austria  1,375  (0.01)  23%  High  Low  Med    21.5   (0.02)    0.24   0.01   1.51   0.36   0.98  
Belgium  2,027  0.00   17%  Med  Med  Low    19.5   0.21     0.19   0.02   2.02   0.31   0.84  
Brazil  6,428  (0.00)  14%  Low  Low  Med    19.1   0.13     0.06   0.00   1.25   0.12   0.45  
Canada  13,537  (0.01)  30%  High  High  High    5.3   0.37     0.04   0.06   2.07   0.16   0.42  
Chile  2,036  (0.01)  20%  High  Med  High    24.8   0.03     0.16   0.00   1.60   0.29   0.19  
China 
Mainland 
15,469  (0.01)  26%  Low  Med  Med    20.5   0.04     0.02   0.00   2.48   0.08   1.02  
Colombia  258  (0.00)  15%  Med  Low  Med    26.5   0.01     0.51      0.00     0.74   0.58   0.10  
Czech Republic  403  (0.01)  37%  Med  Low  Med    28.3   0.01     0.39   0.00   0.84   0.55   0.74  
Denmark  2,707  (0.00)  46%  High  Med  High    16.0   0.28     0.14   0.04   2.12   0.26   0.76  
Finland  2,691  (0.00)  23%  High  High  Low    12.0   0.12     0.14   0.02   2.09   0.26   1.00  
France  9,184  (0.01)  22%  Low  Med  Low    13.5   0.09     0.06   0.02   2.37   0.22   0.88  
Germany  10,862  (0.00)  29%  Med  Med  Low    21.5   0.26     0.05   0.02   2.40   0.18   0.92  
Greece  3,419  (0.01)  26%  Low  Med  Med    28.3   0.09     0.11   0.00   2.48   0.20   0.45  
Hong Kong  8,845  (0.01)  46%  High  High  High    19.5   0.30     0.05   0.01   1.49   0.16   0.87  
Hungary  390  (0.01)  21%  Med  Low  High    8.8   0.13     0.46   0.00   1.17   0.54   0.89  
India  6,322  (0.00)  21%  Low  Low  Low    19.1   0.19     0.06   0.00   2.28   0.15   0.77  
Indonesia  4,472  (0.00)  36%  Low  Low  Low    18.3   0.04     0.09   0.00   1.33   0.16   0.86  
Ireland  998  0.00   53%  High  Med  High    5.1   0.46     0.27   0.04   2.46   0.45   0.55  
Israel  1,479  (0.00)  36%  Med  Med  Med    24.8   0.26     0.21   0.09   1.94   0.40   0.74  
Italy  3,725  (0.01)  17%  Low  Med  Low    24.8   0.14     0.11   0.01   1.96   0.22   1.19  
Japan  38,691  (0.00)  15%  Low  High  Med    20.5   0.12     0.01   0.01   1.58   0.07   1.17  
Jordan  101  0.00   37%  Med  High  High    26.8   0.02     0.75   0.00   2.36   0.81   0.50  
Korea  8,173  (0.01)  38%  Low  Med  Low    20.5   0.02     0.05   0.01   1.19   0.22   0.44  
Luxembourg  474  0.00   42%  High  High  Low    13.5   0.30     0.38   0.00   2.35   0.48   0.66  
Malaysia  7,919  (0.01)  37%  Med  High  High    14.8   0.14     0.06   0.00   1.18   0.16   0.80  
Mexico  3,295  (0.01)  35%  Low  Low  Med    19.1   0.58     0.10   0.00   1.28   0.18   0.52  
Netherlands  2,740  (0.01)  25%  High  High  Med    16.5   0.19     0.16   0.02   2.85   0.32   0.96  
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Table I: Summary statistics by country (Continued) 
           Country-level competition variables  Properties of accounting     Other control variables    
      ROAt-ROAt-1 
Mean 
reversion 
Product  
market 
Capital 
market 
Labor  
market    Earnings 
management  Timeliness   
Market 
share  R&D  MTB  Herfindahl 
 index  Segments 
Country  N  Mean            Mean  Mean     Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean 
New Zealand  1,025  (0.01)  37%  High  Low  Med    4.8  0.51    0.29  0.02  2.54  0.46  0.49 
Norway  2,308  (0.01)  36%  High  Med  Med    5.8  0.49    0.15  0.02  2.09  0.31  0.89 
Peru  1,283  0.00  11%  Low  Low  Low    24.8  0.12    0.17  0.00  1.79  0.23  0.31 
Philippines  2,525  (0.00)  48%  Low  Low  Low    8.8  0.20    0.13  0.00  1.05  0.34  0.50 
Poland  1,496  (0.01)  34%  Low  Low  Low    8.8  0.19    0.20  0.00  1.96  0.35  0.98 
Portugal  860  (0.00)  26%  High  Med  Low    25.1  0.28    0.33  0.00  1.81  0.42  0.92 
Qatar  88  0.01  17%  Med  Med  Med    26.8  0.07    0.57  0.00  2.26  0.73  0.58 
Russia  1,095  (0.00)  13%  Low  Low  Med    25.0  0.16    0.15  0.00  1.50  0.24  0.80 
Singapore  4,755  (0.01)  33%  High  High  High    21.6  0.15    0.09     0.00  1.50  0.26  0.87 
Slovakia 
iaRepublic 
109  (0.01)  45%  Low  Low  Med    18.3  0.10    0.80  0.00  0.74  0.87  0.53 
Slovenia  61  (0.00)  7%  Low  Low  Low    17.5  0.19    0.75  0.01  1.57  0.81  1.13 
South Africa  3,900  (0.00)  47%  Low  High  Low    5.6  0.10    0.11  0.00  2.11  0.24  0.64 
Spain  1,870  (0.00)  18%  Med  High  Low    18.6  0.37    0.22  0.00  2.44  0.35  0.90 
Sweden  6,424  (0.00)  21%  High  High  Low    6.8  0.53    0.07  0.05  2.58  0.20  0.87 
Switzerland  4,644  (0.00)  22%  Med  High  High    22.0  0.36    0.09  0.03  2.30  0.20  0.99 
Taiwan  9,991  (0.01)  18%  Med  High  High    22.5  0.21    0.04  0.03  1.49  0.11  0.24 
Thailand  7,416  (0.00)  30%  Med  Med  High    18.3  0.39    0.06  0.00  1.23  0.14  0.49 
Turkey  1,831  (0.01)  44%  Med  Low  High    28.3    (0.01)    0.18  0.00  2.17  0.33  0.29 
USA  78,298  (0.02)  34%  Med  High  High    2.0  0.31    0.01  0.09  2.03  0.07  0.56 
UK  19,532  (0.00)  30%  High  High  High    7.0  0.28    0.03  0.05  2.37  0.14  0.52 
The definition of the product, capital, and labor market competition variables and corruption measures are provided in the  appendix. High (Low) denotes 
countries with competition variables in the highest (lowest) tercile and Med in the medium terciles. Earnings management is the country average rank across all 
four measures (two earnings smoothness and two earnings discretion measures) calculated as in Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003). Timeliness is the estimated 
sum of coefficients on stock returns and stock returns times an indicator variable for negative returns, from an asymmetric timeliness model of earnings and 
returns as in Bushman and Piotroski (2006). Market share is firm sales over sum of sales of all firms classified in the same Fama-French (1997) industry and 
country-year. R&D is research and development expenses over sales. MTB is market value of equity at fiscal year-end over book value of equity. Industry MTB 
is the average MTB of all firms included in a Fama-French (1997) industry and country-year. Industry R&D is the average R&D of all firms included in a Fama-
French (1997) industry and country-year. Herfindahl is the sum of squared market shares across companies for each industry-country-year. Segments is the 
natural logarithm of the number of four-digit SIC codes that the firm operates in.  
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Table II: Correlation matrix 
Variable  Market 
share 
(1) 
R&D 
(2) 
MTB 
(3) 
Industry 
MTB 
(4) 
Industry 
R&D 
(5) 
Herfindahl 
index 
(6) 
Segments 
(7) 
Product 
market 
competition 
 (8) 
Capital 
market 
competition  
(9) 
Labor 
market 
competition  
(10) 
Less 
corruption 
(11) 
Earnings 
Management 
(12) 
(1)  1.000                       
(2)  -0.069  1.000                     
(3)  0.009  0.060  1.000                   
(4)  0.049  0.110  0.269  1.000                 
(5)  -0.107  0.510  0.076  0.216  1.000               
(6)  0.630  -0.035  0.010  0.082  -0.072  1.000             
(7)  0.100  -0.121  0.006  -0.027  -0.149  -0.036  1.000           
(8)  0.054  0.070  0.048  0.145  0.143  0.095  -0.140  1.000         
(9)  -0.059  0.002  0.025  0.038  0.010  -0.080  0.025  0.350  1.000       
(10)  -0.151  0.099  -0.010  -0.048  0.205  -0.223  -0.092  0.409  0.432  1.000     
(11)  -0.067  0.126  0.042  0.093  0.249  -0.010  -0.035  0.617  0.397  0.320  1.000   
(12)  0.160  -0.197  -0.039  -0.112  -0.393  0.158  0.181  -0.364  -0.043  -0.380  -0.510  1.000 
Timeliness  -0.032  0.123  0.028  0.084  0.242  -0.012  -0.161  0.476  0.156  0.249  0.512  -0.579 
Table II presents Pearson correlation coefficients. Market share is firm sales over sum of sales of all firms classified in the same Fama-French (1997) industry and country-year. 
R&D is research and development expenses over sales. MTB is market value of equity at fiscal year-end over book value of equity. Industry MTB is the average MTB of all firms 
included in a Fama-French (1997) industry and country-year. Industry R&D is the average R&D of all firms included in a Fama-French (1997) industry and country-year. 
Herfindahl is the sum of squared market shares across companies for each industry-country-year. Segments is the natural logarithm of the number of four-digit SIC codes that the 
firm operates in. Less corruption is a measure of the lack of bribery and corruption in a country from the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook. Earnings management is the 
country average rank across all four measures (two earnings smoothness and two earnings discretion measures) calculated as in Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003). Timeliness is 
the estimated sum of coefficients on stock returns and stock returns times an indicator variable for negative returns, from an asymmetric timeliness model of earnings and returns 
as in Bushman and Piotroski (2006). All other variables are defined in the appendix. The definition of the product, capital, and labor market competition variables are provided in 
the appendix. 
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Table III: Relation between persistence in accounting profitability and country-level competition 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Parameter  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t 
Intercept  -0.0420  -20.14  -0.0482  -25.32  -0.0316  -15.14  -0.0709  -30.58  -0.0596  -21.02 
(ROAt-Et(ROA))  0.0853  2.49  -0.1023  -4.06  -0.2103  -7.47  -0.1320  -4.83  0.0040  0.10 
(ROAt-Et(ROA))*Market share  0.4041  9.20  0.3773  8.65  0.3828  8.64  0.3696  8.44  0.3965  8.97 
(ROAt-Et(ROA))*R&D  -0.0553  -2.13  -0.0517  -1.99  -0.0522  -2.01  -0.0591  -2.28  -0.0634  -2.44 
(ROAt-Et(ROA))*MTB  -0.0053  -5.95  -0.0052  -5.82  -0.0052  -5.79  -0.0051  -5.67  -0.0052  -5.80 
(ROAt-Et(ROA))*Industry MTB  -0.0222  -6.17  -0.0241  -6.60  -0.0243  -6.66  -0.0257  -6.96  -0.0178  -4.90 
(ROAt-Et(ROA))*Industry R&D  0.2327  3.89  0.2513  4.19  0.2470  4.08  0.2306  3.73  0.1777  2.87 
(ROAt-Et(ROA))*Herfindahl  -0.2429  -5.78  -0.2650  -6.26  -0.2381  -5.48  -0.2167  -5.04  -0.1889  -4.35 
(ROAt-Et(ROA))*Segments  -0.0025  -0.31  0.0058  0.72  0.0036  0.45  0.0094  1.16  0.0057  0.70 
(ROAt-Et(ROA))*Less corruption  0.0070  1.94  -0.0068  -2.06  -0.0148  -4.69  -0.0147  -4.54  0.0128  3.23 
(ROAt-Et(ROA))*Earnings timeliness  0.1418  2.96  0.0334  0.71  0.0619  1.29  -0.0119  -0.23  0.1038  1.99 
(ROAt-Et(ROA))*Product market competition  -0.0658  -9.86 
       
    -0.0747  -10.00 
(ROAt-Et(ROA))*Capital market competition     
-0.0290  -5.14 
   
    -0.0234  -3.49 
(ROAt-Et(ROA))*Labor market competition         
0.0067  1.73      0.0304  6.43 
(ROAt-Et(ROA))*Earnings management              -0.0027  -3.39  0.0009  1.08 
Adj. R-squared  15.29% 
 
14.99% 
 
14.75%    14.81%    15.98%    
N  319,029    319,029    319,029    319,029    319,029   
Dependent variable is the change in return on assets between year t and t+1. The unit of analysis is the firm-year. Market share is firm sales over sum of sales of all firms classified 
in the same Fama-French (1997) industry and country-year. R&D is research and development expenses over sales. MTB is market value of equity at fiscal year-end over book 
value of equity. Industry MTB is the average MTB of all firms included in a Fama-French (1997) industry and country-year. Industry R&D is the average R&D of all firms 
included in a Fama-French (1997) industry and country-year. Herfindahl is the sum of squared market shares across companies for each industry-country-year. Segments is the 
natural logarithm of the number of four-digit SIC codes that the firm operates in. Less corruption is a measure of the lack of bribery and corruption in a country from the IMD 
World Competitiveness Yearbook. Earnings management is the country average rank across all four measures (two earnings smoothness and two earnings discretion measures) 
calculated as in Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003). Timeliness is the estimated sum of coefficients on stock returns and stock returns times an indicator variable for negative 
returns, from an asymmetric timeliness model of earnings and returns as in Bushman and Piotroski (2006). All other variables are defined in the appendix. All variables are 
included as main effects but only the interactions are presented for parsimony. The lag change in ROA and all interaction terms between lag change in ROA and other variables are 
also included but not reported in the table. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and (i) clustered at the firm and year level and (ii) adjusted using the Murphy-Topel 
variance estimator for two-step models (Murphy and Topel 1985).  
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Table IV Relation between performance persistence and earnings management, by positive and negative unexpected profitability 
  
(1) 
All firm-years 
(2) 
Domestic firms 
(3) 
Multinationals 
(4) 
Value-weighted 
(5) 
Control for 
economic 
development 
Parameter  Coef.  t  Coef.  t  Coef.  t  Coef.  t  Coef.  t 
Intercept  -0.0319  -10.96  -0.04  -8.83  -0.01  -1.16  -0.02  -1.94  -0.01  -3.85 
(ROAt-Et(ROA))  -0.1088  -2.70  -0.19  -3.73  -0.19  -1.96  -0.17  -3.19  -0.28  -5.06 
(ROAt-Et(ROA))*Product market competition  -0.0173  -2.33  -0.01  -1.46  -0.03  -1.28  -0.01  -1.93  0.00  0.13 
(ROAt-Et(ROA))*Capital market competition  -0.0249  -3.43  -0.02  -2.02  -0.04  -2.51  -0.02  -1.58  -0.03  -3.97 
(ROAt-Et(ROA))*Labor market competition  -0.0159  -3.10  -0.01  -1.56  -0.02  -1.05  0.00  0.25  0.00  -0.76 
(ROAt-Et(ROA))*Earnings management  0.0031  3.47  0.05  0.77  0.64  3.41  -0.02  -0.12  0.11  2.01 
(ROAt-Et(ROA))*Economic development     
           
-0.01  -1.10 
Neg*(ROAt-Et(ROA))*Product market competition  -0.0944  -6.16  -0.10  -5.83  -0.01  -0.15  -0.01  -0.38  -0.12  -7.62 
Neg*(ROAt-Et(ROA))*Capital market competition  0.0042  0.29  0.01  0.43  0.03  0.97  -0.02  -0.50  0.01  0.85 
Neg*(ROAt-Et(ROA))*Labor market competition  0.0817  8.00  0.09  7.09  0.02  0.60  -0.03  -1.64  0.05  4.54 
Neg*(ROAt-Et(ROA))*Earnings management  -0.0084  -4.66  0.28  1.92  -1.22  -3.47  0.03  0.18  0.02  0.15 
Neg*(ROAt-Et(ROA))*Economic development                        0.13  6.30 
Firm, industry and country-level controls (Table III)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
(ROAt-Et(ROA))* Control variables   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared  16.54%  17.41%  13.08%  14.87%  16.61% 
N    319,029  
 
  238,409  
  
  32,694  
  
  319,029  
  
   319,029  
  
Dependent variable is the change in return on assets between year t and t+1. The unit of analysis is the firm-year. Neg is an indicator that takes the value one for firms with 
negative unexpected ROAs and zero otherwise. We proxy for unexpected ROA by taking the difference of the realized ROA and the expected ROA, estimated as the predicted 
value from the model using equation (2). Earnings management is the country average rank across all four measures (two earnings smoothness and two earnings discretion 
measures) calculated as in Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003). All other variables are defined in the appendix. All variables are included as main effects but only the interactions 
are presented for parsimony. The lag change in ROA and all interaction terms between lag change in ROA and other variables are also included but not reported in the table. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and (i) clustered at the firm and year level and (ii) adjusted using the Murphy-Topel variance estimator for two-step models 
(Murphy and Topel 1985).  
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Table V Robustness test – one stage estimation 
Parameter  Estimate  t 
Intercept  -0.1654  -8.85 
ROAt  0.7996  22.10 
ROAt*Market share  0.1569  2.41 
ROAt*R&D  -0.4390  -3.40 
ROAt*MTB  0.0132  5.81 
ROAt*Industry MTB  -0.0043  -0.66 
ROAt*Industry R&D  0.2576  1.45 
ROAt*Herfindahl  -0.1931  -3.05 
ROAt*Segments  -0.0136  -1.07 
ROAt*Dividends  -0.0207  -0.53 
ROAt*Dividend Indicator  0.2476  13.68 
ROAt*Size  0.0332  8.50 
ROAt*Leverage  -0.3771  -10.61 
ROAt*Less corruption  0.0075  1.15 
ROAt*Earnings Timeliness  -0.3618  -4.47 
ROAt*Product market competition  -0.0715  -5.87 
ROAt*Capital market competition  -0.0204  -1.93 
ROAt*Labor market competition  -0.0414  -5.00 
ROAt*Earnings Management  0.0049  3.21 
Neg*ROAt*Market share  -0.3233  -3.34 
Neg*ROAt*R&D  0.3518  2.63 
Neg*ROAt*MTB  -0.0145  -5.79 
Neg*ROAt*Industry MTB  -0.0096  -1.22 
Neg*ROAt*Industry R&D  -0.0277  -0.14 
Neg*ROAt*Herfindahl  0.1653  2.15 
Neg*ROAt*Segments  -0.0489  -3.00 
Neg*ROAt*Dividends  0.0700  0.87 
Neg*ROAt*Dividend Indicator  -0.5186  -16.20 
Neg*ROAt*Size  -0.0543  -12.56 
Neg*ROAt*Leverage  0.2443  6.23 
Neg*ROAt*Less corruption  0.0131  1.56 
Neg*ROAt*Earnings Timeliness  0.5933  5.29 
Neg*ROAt*Product market competition  -0.0483  -3.34 
Neg*ROAt*Capital market competition  -0.0240  -1.78 
Neg*ROAt*Labor market competition  0.0726  7.39 
Neg*ROAt*Earnings Management  -0.0083  -2.45 
Adj. R-squared  53.2%    
N       319,029     
Dependent variable is the change in return on asset between year t and t+1. The unit of analysis is the firm-year. 
Neg is an indicator that takes the value one for firms with negative unexpected ROAs and zero otherwise. We 
proxy for unexpected ROA by taking the difference of the realized ROA and the expected ROA, estimated as the 
predicted value from the model using equation (2). Market share is firm sales over sum of sales of all firms 
classified in the same Fama-French (1997) industry and country-year. R&D is research and development expenses 
over sales. MTB is market value of equity at fiscal year-end over book value of equity. Industry MTB is the 
average MTB of all firms included in a Fama-French (1997) industry and country-year. Industry R&D is the 
average R&D of all firms included in a Fama-French (1997) industry and country-year. Herfindahl is the sum of 
squared market shares across companies for each industry-country-year. Segments is the natural logarithm of the 
number of four-digit SIC codes that the firm operates in.  Dividends is dividends over book value of equity. 
Dividend indicator is an indicator variable that takes a value of one for firms that pay dividend and zero otherwise. 
Size is the natural logarithm of sales. Leverage is total debt over total assets. Earnings management is the country 
average rank across all four measures (two earnings smoothness and two earnings discretion measures) calculated 
as in Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003). Timeliness is the estimated sum of coefficients on stock returns and stock 
returns times an indicator variable for negative returns, from an asymmetric timeliness model of earnings and 
returns as in Bushman and Piotroski (2006). Less corruption is a measure of the lack of bribery and corruption in a  
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country from the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook. All other variables are defined in the appendix. All 
variables are included as main effects but only the interactions are presented for parsimony. The lag change in 
ROA and all interaction terms between lag change in ROA and other variables are also included but not reported 
in the table. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm and year level. 
 